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This paper surveys the recent empirical literature on wage premium to university 
selectivity, and provides new evidence to this literature on a country such as Canada 
that has a distinct higher education system from those already analyzed.  I estimate 
the wage premium to university selectivity using Canadian data and two popular 
methods to correct for non-random selection in universities of different quality:  
matching methods and instrumental variables (IV). I estimate a wage premium of 
7% using the matching estimator, and a premium of 14.8% using the IV estimator 
for alumni of selective Canadian universities 4–6 years after graduation. My 
findings are in line with the literature on countries with a moderately differentiated 
higher education system that has low variation in tuition fees and is well supported 
by public funds.  
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1   Introduction  
Labor market prospects for recent graduates depend mainly on their acquired skills, 
ability and work productivity. In particular, the last two are unobservable characteristics. 
From an employer’s point of view, an inexpensive instrument that is often used as a 
signal for these unobserved attributes is the prestige, reputation, quality or selectivity at 
admission of post-secondary institution where the potential employee received their 
degree. Hence, employers statistically discriminate based on two possible scenarios that 
point them to the better applicant for the job: either because better universities attract and 
skim the better students (hence, inherently productive employees), or because better 
universities make better graduates (everything else equal). As a result, the employees’ 
employability and wage rates would differ. The differences in labor market outcomes 
may also reflect benefits from peer effects or a better alumni network that more selective 
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universities offer. I survey the literature that recognizes and attempts to separate two 
main sources of wage differentials: sorting of students at admission and the added value 
(university training, peer or network effects) from studying in a selective1 university. This 
remains a challenging task given the lack of consensus in estimated wage returns to 
university selectivity.  A non-contestable outcome of this survey is the differences in 
estimates with respect to the context of the higher education (HE) systems under 
evaluation. 
The literature on university selectivity premium on wages2 is vast and focuses mainly 
on countries with a polarized education system (such as the U.S., Columbia or Chile), 
where the differences in university selectivity are evidently large.  This paper revisits the 
question of wage premium to university quality in a different context, such as the 
Canadian one. The Canadian case is interesting and different from the countries that have 
been investigated in the literature. In Canada the most prestigious universities3 are 
public universities, relying at an almost equal extent on public and private funds. The 
per-student public funding to Canadian universities is relatively homogeneous, even 
though it varies by province. Although not yet shown analytically,  the variation in 
Canadian universities’ selectivity falls between  the selective HE systems in the 
Americas (U.S., Chile, Colombia that have high tuition fees with a relatively high 
variance and select students based on a standardized entry exam), and the publicly 
funded HE systems in the E.U. that are equally endowed in terms of public resources, 
charge very low/no tuition with low variance and admit students based on their  high 
school grade point average (GPA). In the later context, as expected the university 
selectivity premium is lower than in the former. 
The main novelty of this paper is to provide the first study using Canadian data 
that addresses non-random sorting of students to different universities at the 
admission stage. The reason behind the lack of other research on the topic is due to 
                                                 
1 I use the term university “selectivity” rather than quality or reputation. The latter two terms delegate 
the cause of wage differential to a source, but the first term is viewed as a catchall term for the 
effect that university standing has on wages (Broecke, 2012, p.97). 
2 The university selectivity wage premium refers to the average wage differential of employees 
that except for the selectivity of the universities they have completed, have similar characteristics 
such as high school grades, non-cognitive skills, aspirations for post-secondary education, family 
background, major choice, occupation and experience in the labor market. 
3  Differently from the United States, in Canada college and university refer to different 
academic entities.  In Canada, colleges offer vocational trades programs and Bachelor-
equivalent degrees in arts and sciences focused on practical aspect of learning.  College 
instructors in Canada focus on teaching and have extensive experience in the private sector. 
Universities offer Bachelor degrees with research opportunities leading to graduate studies. 
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the absence of crucial information in Canadian surveys such as the name of the 
university that individuals completed. To the best of my knowledge, the only other 
paper that asks how university characteristics affect graduates’ earnings for Canada 
is Betts et al. (2013). They provide a descriptive analysis using the Canadian National 
Graduates Survey. This dataset contains in- formation on the name of the university, but 
lacks a measure for individuals’ academic ability prior to enrollment. I use a new, 
previously unexploited data, the Canadian Youth in Transition Survey (YITS), which 
is the first Canadian data to contain both the above information and more: the high 
school grades as measure of ability; the name of the university that they enrolled and 
graduated from; and the province of residence while in high school, university and 
when last interviewed. This data also offers rich and detailed background information 
on individuals, their families, high school experience, and a measure of their 
performance during their first academic year in university (their grade point average). 
The YITS also contains information on generally unobserved characteristics such as 
aspirations, student-elicited rating of their skills on communication, problem solving 
and math skills. In addition, there is available information on the frequency at which 
the student volunteered, and the number of on- and off-campus clubs that the student 
is actively engaged in. I leverage the large set of variables in the YITS to correct for 
the non-random sorting of students at admission stage into universities of different 
selectivity.  
Although the YITS has an unusual set of information on university graduates, the 
possibility that other unobserved characteristics of individuals (e.g. non-cognitive 
skills) that guide sorting into universities of different quality and/or wage differentials 
cannot be ruled out unambiguously. To address this concern, I use an instrumental 
variable estimator in line with Long (2008). The exclusion restriction that this study 
uses (namely, the average selectivity measure for the institutions within a geographic 
radius of the student’s high school residence) leads to a local average treatment effect 
(LATE) estimate reflecting mainly the wage premium of the subsample of students who 
live in regions with better universities, which in turn makes them more likely to attend 
a better university. Consequently, the students that reallocate to attend a better 
university from regions that originally do not favor them in this respect, are in fact 
weighted relatively less. It is likely that the expected returns to university quality are 
higher for these students that are willing to invest more. I propose a second exclusion 
restriction that offers a new source of exogeneity, and potentially leads to a LATE 
estimate of the wage premium with better external validity properties because it is 
representative of both students who attend a university close to their parents’ home or 
those move out to a different province to do so. In addition to the Long (2008) 
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instrument, I also use the difference of the average university selectivity between the 
students’ pre-university residence region and the residence region while at university. 
In this paper, I use all the three types of selectivity measures used in the literature: 
the average high school grade of the entering cohort (which is the main admission 
criteria in Canada), the “Best Overall Reputation Ranking” (hereafter Reputation 
Ranking) published yearly by the Maclean’s magazine, and I also construct a quality 
measure using dimension reducing techniques in line with previous literature. Using 
the distribution of the selectivity measures and the university type (research, teaching 
intensive or both) I group the universities into three groups from most to least 
selective: A, B and C. I find that graduates of selective Canadian universities (group 
A and B) earn 7% higher hourly wages than graduates of less selective universities 
(group C). These returns are not driven by differences in high school GPA (sorting of 
students at admission) or other student characteristics that are available in the YITS. 
The instrumental variable estimates (around 8–14.8%), that are free of bias from   
unobserved characteristics, are higher in magnitude than the matching estimates, but 
the difference is statistically insignificant. Overall, the findings are in line with the 
literature on university selectivity that estimates a wage premium of 15–28% for 
graduates of the most selective universities in countries with a strongly differentiated 
HE system, and a premium of 2–7.4% in countries with moderately differentiated HE 
system. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I present a literature review in Section 2 
while describing the Canadian HE system in comparison to that of other countries 
analyzed in the literature. I introduce the main specification and discuss the methodology 
in Section 3, the data in Section 4, and the results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2    Literature Review 
In this section I present a review of the literature on wage premium of university 
quality. All the papers discussed conduct the analysis of selectivity premium at the 
undergraduate level, 4 their outcome of interest is the graduates’ private wage rate, 
they conduct a quantitative empirical analysis, and they acknowledge and attempt to 
                                                 
4 Even though excluded from this literature survey, it is important to note that the selectivity of graduate 
studies has been studied for the MBA program (Chen et al., 2012; Grove and Hussey, 2011), and the 
university selectivity at the undergraduate level has also been shown to affect other non-monetary 
outcomes such as dropping out behavior (Hanushek et al., 2008), college completion (Cohodes and 
Goodman, 2014; Heil et al., 2014), attending graduate school and expectations on wages (Loyalka et 
al., 2012), choice of siblings’ PSE (post-secondary education) institution (Goodman et al., 2015), 
marriage market (Kaufmann et al., 2013), intergenerational effects (Kaufmann et al., 2014), PSE exit 
exam scores (Saavedra and Saavedra, 2011), and social returns such as becoming a more involved 
citizen through voting behavior (Solis, 2013). 
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address the non-random selection of students in universities of different quality. In 
Table 1, I provide a tabulation of the wage premium estimates to university selectivity 
by estimation method and country. 
2.1    Estimation Method 
In the early literature, the premium to university quality is most often explored using 
cross- sectional data and a “selection on observables”5 approach (Heckman and Robb, 
1985). 6  The majority of these studies find a positive and significant premium of 
university quality on earnings. The recent literature has been more concerned with causal 
inference, and employs seven different approaches to address the non-random selection 
of students in universities of different quality as shown in Table  1:  (i) Least Squares 
(LS) estimator is presented as the benchmark; (ii) Matching Estimator (ME); (iii) sibling 
or twin Fixed Effects estimator (FE); (iv) Self-revelation (SR) model suggested by Dale 
and Krueger (2002); (v) Applicant-matched (AM) model also suggested by Dale and 
Krueger (2002); (vi) Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator as suggested in Long (2008); 
(vii) and the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) method introduced by Thistlewaite 
and Campbell (1960) and reviewed by Lee and Lemieux (2010) for the empirical 
economist.  Data and setting limitations allow me to use in this paper three of the above 
approaches when analyzing Canadian data: the linear LS estimator, ME and IV. I discuss 
the advantages and disadvantage of all seven methods below and conclude that wage 
premium estimates show consistency across the different methods but vary by type of 
education system. 
As seen from Table 1, for the same country (and sometimes using the exact same data such as 
in Long (2008), Broecke (2012), Borgen (2014)) the different methods deliver different 
results. There are advantages to each of these methods, as there are weaknesses in their 
application. The main advantage of the matching estimator as argued in Black and Smith 
(2004) is to allow for a non-restrictive functional form, in contrast with the conventional 
linear least squares estimator (LS). The weakness of both methods is its reliance on the 
available information in the data and the “selection of observables” assumption. Among the 
studies that follow these two estimation methods, Brewer et al. (1999) and Lang and Siniver  
(2011) differ slightly in their approach. Brewer et al. (1999) use a model-based correction to 
address the self-selection issue but they find a significant premium of 20% that remains 
 
                                                 
5 The approach assumes that wage premium estimates do not suffer of omitted variable bias as 
long as the model controls for all observable and measurable characteristics of individuals. 
Therefore, it rules out the existence of any unmeasurable omitted variable. 
6 For example, Brewer and Ehrenberg (1996), Dearden et al. (2002), Monks (2000), Behrman et al. 
(1996), Loury and Garman (1995), and James et al. (1989). 
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Table 1: Wage Premium (%) to University Selectivity by Estimation Method and 
Country 
Country        Study    LS  ME  FE       SR       AM       IV        RDD 
China Hartoga et al. (2010) 28g       
         
US Brewer et al. (1999) 20sd       
US Long (2010) 5sd       
US Andrews et al. (2016) 10--
21g 
      
US Black (2005)                      10--
21g 
      
US Black (2004) 11--
16g 
15--
25g  
     
US Brand and Halaby 
(2006) 
19g 14g,IN      
US Long (2008)                       2sd; 
22.4g 
13.4g             -13sd,IN                 26sd,I
N        
 
US Dale and Krueger (2002) 8h                          -2h,IN        -
0.1h,IN 
  
US Dale and Krueger (2014) 6h,LR                          -2LR,IN    
US Behrman et al. (1996)       21.2g                     
19.1g 
    
US Hoekstra (2009)                                                                            18g 
Chile Bordon and Braga 
(2014) 
11.5sd
; 26g     
                                                               6.5--
8g 
Colombia Saavedra (2009)                                                                               20g 
Israel Lang and Siniver (2011)    9--21g       
UK Chevalier and Conlon 
(2003)             
6g       
UK Hussain et al. (2009) 6sd       
UK Walker and Zhu (2017) 10g,LR       
UK Britton et al. (2016) 6g,LR       
UK Broecke (2012) 9.7sd; 
20g 
                        5--7sd;  
16--22g    
4--6sd   
Italy Triventi and Trivellato 
(2012)                 
            2g,IN      
Italy Brunello and Capellari 
(2008) 
7.4g       
Norway Borgen (2014) 2sd             1.5sd 2sd             5sd,LR  
Sweden Lindahl and Regner 
(2005) 
7g              4g     
Australia Birch et al. (2009) 0.6--
1.6g 
      
LS= Least Squares estimator with an identification strategy that relies on a rich set of covariate. 
ME= Average Treatment on the Treated effect estimated by the nearest neighbor (NNM)  or the 
propensity score (PSM) matching. 
FE= Sibling or Twin Fixed Effects estimator. 
SR= Dale and Krueger (2002) Self-revelation Model 
AM= Dale and Krueger (2002) Applicant-Matched Model 
IV= Instrumental Variable estimator using the exclusion restriction as proposed in Long (2008). 
RDD= Regression Discontinuity Design. 
IN= Indicates that the estimate is statistically insignificant and not different from zero. 
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LR= Indicates estimates on earnings that are recorded more than 5 years after graduation 
Sd = Indicates that the premium estimate corresponds to per one standard deviation of the composite 
quality index/university characteristic used in the respective paper. 
H = Indicates that the premium estimate corresponds to per one hundred points of the average 
SAT/GMAT/entry exam score used in the respective paper. 
 
g= Indicates that the premium estimate corresponds to an elite/top university grouping with respect to 
the prestige/reputation/ranking that is determined by the category/type of the institution or by the 
top quartile of the selectivity measure used in the respective paper.  
 
unaffected by the correction. Lang and Siniver (2011) investigate the earnings of an elite 
university’s graduates, and compare those to a non-elite college that they claim is similar in 
many aspects except for the reputation in the labor market. This may be viewed as a match 
based on university characteristics, rather than individuals’ characteristics. 
The sibling/twin fixed effects (FE) estimator, first introduced in Behrman et al. (1996), is 
a within-household estimator and the FE purges all the genetically identical but unobserved 
and omitted characteristics that the siblings share.  
This approach implicitly assumes that the university choices are random within 
family (see Harmon et al., 2003, for the same discussion on returns to years of 
education). However, Goodman et al. (2015) shows that this is clearly not the case. 
This is why both Behrman et al. (1996) and Borgen (2014) find that the FE estimates 
are statistically not different from the LS estimates. 
The SR model, and more so the AM model, are viewed as a more rigorous way of 
control- ling for the unobserved motivation, aspiration and ambition of the students, 
which is assumed to be revealed by the average selectivity of the universities where each 
individual applied but was not admitted. The AM model is more specific in that it 
explicitly matches the students that have been accepted and rejected by the same 
universities and compares their earnings. Using U.S. data these two  methods deliver low  
and insignificant estimates of the premium  (Dale and Krueger, 2002; Dale and Krueger, 
2014; Long, 2008), but when using U.K. data the wage premium estimate is substantial 
and statistically significant (Broecke, 2012). 
There have been two attempts in the literature so far with the use of instrumental 
variables. Long (2008) estimates a high but insignificant premium for the U.S. 
universities, but Borgen (2014) finds a 5% increase on the earnings of Norwegian 
graduates as the university selectivity measure increases by a standard deviation. As I 
discuss in section 3.3, the reason for the high estimates is related to the local nature of the 
IV estimator that based on the    source of exogeneity of exclusion restrictions. 
Finally, the RDD method is viewed as the “closest cousin” (Lee and Lemieux, 
2010) of experimental designs. However, external validity is often absent and can lead to 
high premium estimates of 18–20% as in Hoekstra (2009) and Saavedra (2009). This 
may be due to the fact that the studies can only use enrollees of one institution (the 
most selective) in   the country as the treatment group, which leads one to question 
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018) 313-349 
 320
the external validity of the estimates. In contrast, Bordon and Braga (2014) are able 
to use information from all universities and estimate a wage premium to university 
selectivity of 6.5–8%. 
2.2    Higher Education System Context 
The tabulation of estimates by country of data and estimation method highlights 
the fact that the context of higher education (HE) systems being analyzed is an 
important dimension of variation in premium estimates. The main differences are in the 
following characteristics: 
(i) the source of funding (public funds vs. private tuition), (ii) the instruments they use 
to select students for admission (high school grades, standardized university entry exams, 
and other information related to non-analytical skills of the students), (iii) the dominance 
of the private HE sector in the country and its relative reputation in comparison to the 
public sector, (iv) and the variation in tuition fees. The relative variance of tuition fees, 
rather than the relative mean, may be used as a measure for the degree of differentiation 
among the HE systems, while relying on the assumption that price (tuition) reflects the 
quality of the product (human capital transmitted by universities). 
Based on the above features, HE systems may be divided into three groups.  The first 
group includes the severely selective systems with high variation in tuition fees, a private 
and reputable university sector, and use as admission criteria the scores on a standardized 
entry exam. Examples include China,  Chile, the United States,  the United Kingdom 
(Hartoga et  al., 2010; OECD, 2007). The HE system of Israel is also similar in 
admission procedures as the countries above, except that the public institutions are the 
most selective ones that also   ask for lower tuition fees. Therefore, characteristics of the 
tuition fees distribution is not informative of the selectivity differentiation in this case, 
as otherwise discussed above. 
The second group includes those HE systems that are in the most part, if not fully, 
supported by public funds (i.e. tuition-free) where obtaining HE is considered a human 
right, not a privilege. Examples are the European Nordic countries like Sweden, Norway 
and Finland (OECD, 2016, pg. 238). The universities in this group admit students based 
on their high school GPA. These countries have a very small private sector that is less 
selective than the public institutions. The third group includes the HE systems that 
borrow similarities from the above two HE system types and have moderately 
differentiated universities.  Examples  are Italy and Australia (Birch et al., 2009; Hoxby, 
1997; Triventi and Trivellato, 2012). In these countries the universities’ main source of 
funds is the government, the private sector is small (e.g.: 10% of enrollment in Italy), the 
tuition fees are moderate and have a low variation, and students are admitted based on 
their high school grades. 
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The Canadian HE system shares similar features with the third group. Higher 
education in Canada 7  is a provincial (not federal) jurisdiction, which led to the 
potentially most decentralized system in the developed world. Although there is no 
unique national system of education (each of the provinces have their own), the 
university sector features a homogeneous and uniform structure with a relatively low 
variation in public resources endowed to each institution. Tuition fees are lower than 
those of the universities in the first group, and have a much lower variation.  There are 
relatively few universities in number8 and students are admitted to universities based on 
their high school grade point average. In line with the above discussion, the estimates 
found in the literature that I summarize in Table 1 are higher for the countries with a 
strongly differentiated university system such as the U.S., Chile, Colombia, Israel and the 
U.K. The selectivity premium is smallest for Australia, and moderate for Italy, Norway 
and Sweden.  In this paper I show that the selectivity premium for Canada is closest in 
magnitude to the universities in the latter group. 
3    Methodology 
3.1    Regression Model 
In this section, I describe the estimation procedures that are used in this paper. I 
estimate equation (1), that defines individual i’s earnings in logarithmic form, log(w), 
as a function of university j’s selectivity, Sj, the set of individual, family and 
institution characteristics, Xij, and an idiosyncratic error term, uij. The main interest of 
the paper lies in estimating parameter β1 in equation (1). 
log(w)ij = β0 + β1Sj + β2Xij + uij     (1) 
I use three different estimation strategies in pursuit of correcting for the sorting of 
students into better universities based on individual characteristics and ability. I use 
least squares and matching methods to correct this endogeneity based on a very rich set 
of student characteristics that are available in the data. I also use an instrumental 
variable approach to control for potential presence of unobserved variables that could 
guide sorting. I describe below the latter two approaches. 
                                                 
7 For a historical overview of the evolution of the Canadian higher education system see Jones 
(2014). 
8 There are 77 public and 13 private universities across Canada. Because of the limited data available 
on university characteristics, I have 46 universities in my sample, all of which are public. In the US, 
this number is much higher; for instance Black and Smith (2006) report 398 colleges in their sample. 
control for the potential presence of unobserved (and thus omitted) variables that could guide sorting. 
I describe below the latter two approaches. 
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3.2    Matching Estimator 
Black and Smith (2004) point out that matching methods outperform least squares by 
allowing for a non-linear selection on observable characteristics and thus do not 
impose a functional form on the type of dependency between the outcome and the 
covariates. They also show that the two methods yield different results. King and 
Nielsen (2016) show that matching on the propensity score lags behind other types of 
matching methods because it produces matches of lower quality that leads to biased 
coefficient estimates and lower efficiency. Following these suggestions in the 
literature, I use a multivariate nearest neighbor matching (NNM) estimator. The 
underlying assumption of matching methods is that, conditional on the pre-treatment 
variables, assignment to treatment is independent of the outcome of interest. The 
matching estimator requires that the treatment variable be of a binary nature, 
indicating the treatment and the comparison group. In this paper, the treatment group 
includes all individuals that graduated from a top university (classification is 
described in section 4), and the comparison group includes those that graduated from 
universities of lower selectivity. 
The method finds matches with similar traits and attributes in the comparison 
group for each treated individual in the sample. In this paper, I select the closest 
matches (or neighbors) by minimizing the Euclidean distance between the 
characteristics of the treated individual and of similar neighbors in the comparison 
group. Hence, the treatment and the comparison group must contain sufficient overlap 
in the values of the pre-treatment variables for matching to be feasible. I allow 
matching with replacement, i.e. each individual in the comparison group may be used 
more than once as a match for different treated individuals. This reduces the 
estimation bias by yielding better matches. Once the closest matches have been 
selected for each treated individual, the counterfactual is estimated as the mean of 
their outcomes (wages). The mean of the differences in wages of the treated 
individuals and the corresponding counterfactual is the estimates of the Average 
Treatment on the Treated (ATT) parameter. 
Empirical papers using matching methods report almost always the ATT estimate, 
assuming that in theory it should be equal to the Average Treatment on the Control 
(ATC) parameter. In a randomized control trial experiment these two parameters are 
equivalent. In this paper I compare the estimates of ATT and ATC (Average 
Treatment on the Control) to provide important insights with respect to the balancing 
property of the sample. 
3.2    Instrumental Variables 
In order to take into account any remaining sorting, not accounted by the available 
information in the data, I use an instrumental variable technique. Leveraging the available 
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information, the YITS, I construct two instrumental (exclusion restrictions) variables to 
extract    the exogenous variation in university selectivity, Sj in equation (1). Both 
instruments are available for the same individuals in the data, and are used 
simultaneously in the IV results presented in section 5.2. 
The first instrument is similar to the one used in Long (2008).   The author proposed 
the use of average selectivity of universities within student’s residential area during high 
school.   Since students tend to attend a university not far away from their parents’ home, 
and possibly in commuting distance, the distance from home may play a crucial role 
when choosing a university. The reasons are obviously related to travel and living costs 
given that Canada is a large and dispersed country. The geographic region in my case is 
the province where the student studied the last two years of high school. Given that the 
higher education system is a provincial jurisdiction, province-specific policies, 
regulations, rules and economic conditions introduce exogenous variation in the quality 
of universities. The instrument in this case exploits the exogenous variation in sorting 
that originates from the university selectivity differences across provinces. 
This instrument highlights the wage premium earned by the students who attended 
a better university because of the availability of better universities in proximity. The 
comparison group in this case are the students who went to a less selective university 
because of a high proportion of low ranked universities in their province, which 
lowers their likelihood of attending a highly ranked university. For these students 
(stayers) the return on their investment for a BA degree is higher than for the 
students that have to invest on moving and living costs away from their parents’ 
household in addition to tuition fees. However, if these students (movers) are willing 
to undergo these investments in order to attend a more selective university, then they 
must be expecting that the returns would compensate for this investment. 
With this in mind, the second instrument that I construct exploits the difference in 
average university selectivity between the province of the students’ high school and 
that of the university. The variable takes a positive value when students moved (in 
order to attend university) to a province with higher average university selectivity 
than their high school province, a zero value (by construction) when students choose 
to go to a university in the same province as their high school, and a negative value 
for those that attended a university in a province with lower average university 
selectivity than their high school province. This instrument leads to a LATE estimate 
that weights relatively more the students that reallocate to a province with a higher 
average university selectivity and also attend a top university. The aim is to estimate 
a LATE that is representative of both students that attend a selective university just 
because many are available in proximity, and of those students that are willing to 
reallocate to a different province in order to attend a selective university. 
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4    Data 
4.1    Individual characteristics 
The main data set used in this paper is the older cohort of the Youth in Transition Survey 
(YITS). Individuals born between 1979–1981 were surveyed every two years starting in 
2000. They were then followed for eight years until the last interview, which was 
conducted in 2008. 
The final sample excludes individuals with disabilities (4.3%), high school dropouts 
(4.81%), high school graduates (24.54%), and those whose educational status is unknown 
(2.89%). In the last cycle of the YITS, among the individuals who had completed some post-
secondary education (PSE), 47% reported having completed a PSE program which is less 
than a Bachelor’s degree (college degree, vocational, trades etc.)9 and 15% a program that is 
higher than a Bachelor’degree (First Professional Degree, Master’s, Ph.D., or post-graduate 
certificate/diploma). Since their wage structure is different from what it is for a regular 
Bachelor’s degree graduate, these two groups are excluded from the final sample.  For the 
main analysis, I focus on respondents who have attained a Bachelor’s degree. In the end, the 
sample of Bachelor’s degree graduates who were working full-time is composed of 1,476 
individuals who were 26–28 years old by December 2007. 
The outcome of interest is the hourly wage rate of the respondents 4–6 years after 
graduating from a university program and are reported as of December 2007. The 
unusual quality and information in the data allow for a large set of covariates to be 
included as controls in the regression analysis. These include:  
 
I. measures of academic aptitude: the high school grades (High school GPA), and 
the grades at the end of the first year in the university (GPA in First Year 
University).  These are reported in the following categories: 90-100%, 80-89%, 
70-79%, 60-69%, and 50-59% or lower intervals. In the regression model I use 
dummy variables indicating the two highest categories10;  
II. measures/proxies for inter-personal skills: an indicator variable if the 
individual ever volunteered (Volunteering, taking value of 1 if ever 
                                                 
9 Canada has the highest rate of tertiary education qualification in the adult population (51% in 
2011, (OECD, 2013)), and this is mostly due to the community college education system 
available in Canada. 
10 Since high school grades are self-reported, there is always the risk that they may be overstated. 
However, in the YITS the students were asked to report a grade interval. This procedure significantly 
reduces the risk of measurement error. 
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volunteered and 0 if not), a measure in hour intervals per week11 dedicated to 
participation in school clubs, teams, or school organizations (Participation in 
School Clubs, taking value of 1 if participated and 0  if not) and non-school 
clubs12 (Participation in Non-school Clubs), a self-reported 1– 5 Likert scale 
rating of own writing and speaking skills in explaining ideas to others, 
speaking to an audience and participating in discussions (Communication 
Skills), a self- reported 1–5 Likert scale rating of own ability to identify 
problems and possible causes, to plan strategies, to solve problems or think of 
new ways to solve problems (Problem Solving Skills), a self-reported 1–5 
Likert scale rating of own ability to use formulas to solve problems, interpret 
graphs or tables, using math to figure out practical things in everyday life (Math 
Ability). The last three variables enter the regression equation as a dummy 
indicator of value 1 for reporting very good to excellent rating and 0 for other 
ratings; 
III. demographic characteristics:  age of the individuals (Age),  a gender indicator 
(taking a value of 1 if student is female and 0 if male), race/community indicators 
(for each variable taking a value of 1 if reported black, aboriginal, or visible 
minority and 0 otherwise), an indicator for command in both English and French 
(value of 1 if reported an English and French speaker and 0 otherwise), an 
indicator for disability that does not impede any aspect of working (reported 
disability takes value 1 and 0 if no disability is reported), a single marital status 
indicator (taking value of 1 if single and 0 otherwise),  an indicator for rural 
residence (Rural,  taking value  of 1 if residing in rural area and 0 otherwise), and 
province of residence dummy variables (British Columbia, Quebec, Manitoba 
and Saskatchewan, Alberta, or Atlantic Provinces, Ontario is the reference 
category); 
IV. family characteristics: a dummy variable of value 1 when at least one parent 
reports some PSE qualification and zero otherwise (Parents PSE), a dummy 
variable of value 1 if student thought that getting PSE was important for their 
parents and 0 otherwise (PSE important for parent), and a dummy variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports at least one older sibling 
(Older sibling);  
                                                 
11 Categories range between 0 and 5, where 0 indicates no participation, 1 indicates less than 1 hour per 
week, 2 indicates between 1–3 hours per week, 3 indicates between 4–7 hours per week, 4 indicates 
between 8–14 hours and 5 indicates more than 15 hours per week. 
12 These include non-school clubs, teams, volunteer work or other organizations, for example 
community sports, music lessons or youth groups not organized through school. 
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V. high school characteristics: a dummy variable of value  1 when high school is 
private  and 0 if public (High school private), a dummy variable of value 1 when 
student reports consuming alcohol more than once a week during high school 
and 0 otherwise (Alcohol Consumption Indicator) which is used as a proxy for 
misbehavior, and a peer-effect variable reported by the student in the form of a 
dummy variable of value 1 if the student reports that their closest high school 
friends planned to continue their education into   PSE and 0 otherwise (Friends 
plan PSE) (see e.g. Christofides et al., 2015); 
VI. university-related variables: duration in months of undergraduate studies as 
shown to be important by Black and Smith (2004) and Black et al. (2005), 
dummy variable indicators for three major groups of fields of study: Social 
Sciences, Humanities and Arts; Business Administration and Commerce; and 
Sciences, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM); 
VII. job characteristics: experience in months following graduation (Experience), 
a set of dummy variable indicators for three occupation groups: Management, 
Business, Finance and Administration; Natural and Applied Sciences; and 
Social Sciences, Education and Governmental Service. The omitted category 
is the fourth group: Art, Culture, Recreation and Sports; Sales, Service and 
other. 
 
Table A.1 contains the summary statistics for the aforementioned individual 
characteristics, and Table A.2 displays the correlation coefficients among these variables. 
On average they are 27 years old. The estimation sample is composed of 56% females, 
16% visible minority, 5% report to have a disability that does not restrict their full 
working potential, more than 79% report having older siblings and 54% of them have at 
least one parent with PSE education, and 86% report that attaining higher education is 
important for their parents.  In the sample 9% of the students attended a private high 
school, more than 70% have a high school GPA higher than 80%, and more than half rate 
themselves as very good or excellent   in communication, problem-solving and math 
skills. About 62% report having volunteered at least once, 21% to have consumed alcohol 
at least once a week while in high school, and about half report to have friends with PSE 
aspirations. On average individuals spend 1–3 hours/week engaged in school clubs, and 
about 4–7 hours/week in non-school clubs. With respect to their PSE experience, about 
28% report a GPA in their first year university to be above 80%. On average the 
undergraduate studies take 13 semesters to complete. The average hourly wage is 25.37 
dollars per hour. The respondents report on average 42 months (or 3.5 years) of post-
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graduation work experience. The sample has an almost uniform distribution across the 
occupation and field of study groups. 
4.2    University characteristics and the quality measures 
A remaining challenge in the literature of university selectivity premium is to properly 
measure selectivity.  Several university characteristics are used individually or all 
together in a regression equation to capture the quality of educational institutions. 
Examples include faculty-student ratio, faculty salaries, enrollment, retention rate, 
publications per researcher, and applicants per place (Behrman et al., 1996; Betts et 
al., 2013; Dearden et al., 2002). Noticing a high correlation between these 
characteristics, some papers either use a single, most important variable (Dale and 
Krueger, 2002; Long, 2010) or use data reduction techniques to combine several 
characteristics in one comprehensive index (Black and Smith, 2004; Long, 2008). 
Other papers use a published quality ranking (Brewer et al., 1999; Monks, 2000). In 
fact Black and Smith (2006) presents evidence in favor of using several proxies 
rather than a single one, and if one should be used they argue that the aver- age 
university entry exam score is the most reliable measure of selectivity in the U.S. I 
use three different selectivity measures: (1) the average GPA of entering cohort 
(GPA), (2) the Maclean’s magazine Overall Reputation Ranking (RR), and (3) the 
Composite Index (CI) that I construct using several university characteristics. 
 I link the YITS to university characteristics from publicly available data. From the 
university ranking issue of Maclean’s magazine published in November 2002, the year 
when the majority of students in the sample started university.  I retrieve the following 
variables from  the magazine’s data: the Overall Reputation Ranking, the average high 
school grade point average of the entering cohort (Entering Cohort GPA),  the percentage 
of full-time faculty  with a Ph.D. degree (Faculty  with Ph.D.),  the number of students 
and full-time professors   per 1000 who have won national awards in the past five years 
(Student Awards and Faculty Awards, respectively), and the number of Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council and Canada Council research grants per 100 full-time 
faculty members (Number Research Grants). From the 2002 CAUT Almanac (CAUT, 
2002) I retrieve the ratio of full-time tenured faculty to the number of students enrolled 
(Faculty-Student Ratio). 
First, in Canada the main admission criteria is the high school GPA.  Therefore, I use 
the average high school grade point average as one of the selectivity measures.  
Second, the Reputation Ranking, is constructed by the Maclean’s magazine. They 
conduct a survey on high school counselors, university officials, CEOs and corporate 
recruiters across Canada and ask them to rank universities based on three attributes: best 
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quality, most innovative, and leaders of tomorrow. Then, Maclean’s calculates a best 
overall Reputation Ranking as a simple average of the rankings on the three attributes. 
Therefore, this measure is based mainly on the experience that the individuals surveyed 
have had with graduates from the different universities and subjective perceptions of the 
relative quality of the human capital transmitted. 
Third, the composite index is viewed as an objective measure of university selectivity. 
Following the literature (Black and Smith, 2004, 2006; Long, 2008), I construct this 
index by using a dimension reduction technique, in this case the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA), to combine a set of university characteristics into a single index. PCA 
yields linear orthogonal combinations of the variables by assigning weights to each. 
These weights are determined by the solution of an optimization problem that maximizes 
the extent to which   the index accounts for the correlation (and not the covariance since 
the inputs are in different units) between university characteristics. I use the first 
principal component of the orthogonal transformation as the Composite Index. This is an 
efficient and commonly used method in the literature to combine many university 
characteristics into one index without worrying about multicollinearity when, otherwise, 
they would be used jointly as covariates in a regression equation. Table A.3 provides a 
list of the university characteristics, that I use to build the Composite Index, and their 
descriptive statistics. Table A.4 shows the correlation coefficients among these variables. 
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the variables are highly correlated. 
The Maclean’s magazine classifies Canadian universities into three types: (1) 
Medical/Doctoral Universities, which are the universities that have medical schools 
and a broad range of PhD programs and research; (2) Comprehensive Universities, 
which are the universities that have a significant degree of research activity and a 
wide range of programs at the undergraduate levels, including professional degrees; 
and (3) Primarily Undergraduate Universities, which includes the universities that are 
largely focused on undergraduate education, with relatively fewer graduate programs 
and graduate students. 
In order to define the university selectivity groups, I use the above classification of 
university together with the selectivity measured described above. Table 2 summarizes 
the definition of selectivity groups, which are built separately for each of the three 
measures (GPA, RR and CI). Group A includes the Medical/Doctoral universities 
that also rank within the top (forth) quartile of the selectivity measure’s distribution. 
Group B includes the Comprehensive universities that rank in the top half of the 
selectivity measure’s distribution and the Medical/Doctoral universities that rank within 
the third quartile. Group C includes all remaining universities. The list of universities in 
each group is shown in Table A.5. 
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Table 2: Explaining the ranking group classification 
 University Type 
Medical/Doctoral Comprehensive Primarily Undergraduate 
 
 
Selectivity Ranking (RR, CI, or GPA) 
Fourth Quartile Group A  
 
Group B 
 
 
 
Group C 
Third Quartile  
Bottom 50%  
 
Students in the YITS graduated from 93 different universities. Even though the university 
data from the magazines were available for only 49 universities, I could match 79% of the 
students in the YITS to their universities in the external data. The high match rate is 
because the magazine reports on the biggest universities in the country, that are also the 
ones that agree to participate in the ranking. The number of observations (students per 
university) were very low for three universities which I exclude from the final sample. 
5    Results 
5.1    Matching estimates 
In this section I discuss the multivariate matching estimates of the university 
selectivity premium on wages along with the least squares estimates, a benchmark in 
the literature (see Table 1). I plot in Figure 1 the wage distribution by university 
selectivity group (A, B and C) of the graduates for each of the three selectivity 
measures (GPA, RR, CI). There is no obvious differences in the graduates earnings 
distributions. Group C university graduates’ distribution is centered more to the left 
than the other two, but the difference is negligible. 
 Table 3 contains the wage premium estimates. The matching estimator requires 
that the treatment variable takes the form of a bivariate zero-one indicator. Therefore, I 
construct the treatment indicator to be a dummy variable. The first treatment variable 
takes the value one if the university that the student graduated from belongs to Group 
A, and zero if it belongs to Group B or C (columns (1)–(3) in Table 3). The second 
treatment variable takes a value one if the university belongs to Group A or B, and zero 
if it belongs to Group C (columns (4)–(6) in Table 3). 
The least squares (LS) regressions include all covariates described in Table A.1 and the 
quadratic of experience.  The coefficient estimates in the first panel of Table  3 indicate a 
1–3% premium on the hourly wage rate, but it is statistically insignificant in all cases. 
These results are in line with the similarities of the distributions shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Wage distribution by university selectivity group 
 
 
(a) GPA    (b) RR 
 
(c) CI 
The selectivity measures are the following: Entering Cohort GPA (GPA), Reputation 
Ranking (RR), and the Composite Index (CI). 
The LS estimator weights each observation equally, in contrast with the matching 
estimator and the IV estimator (discussed in the next subsection) which weight the 
observations non-equally. In addition, the matching estimator also does not impose the 
linear functional form restriction as LS estimator does. Differently from the LS estimates, 
the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) estimates in Table 3 are higher in 
magnitude, and statistically significant in the last three columns. Graduating from a 
Group A or B university earns their alumni a 6–7% premium on the hourly wage rate, 
when compared to Group C university graduates.  The estimate is consistent across the 
three different selectivity measures (GPA, RR, CI). 
I report the ATC estimates in the third panel of Table 3, as a diagnostic check for 
the balancing property on the treatment and comparison groups. In the ideal setting 
of experimental data, the two groups would be well balanced (i.e. very similar in terms 
of observable characteristics) and the estimates of ATT and ATC would be identical 
as a result. This is because it would not matter if we decide to find a match for each 
treated individual, or for each untreated individual since due to the composition of 
the two groups would lead one to find identical matches in both cases. As seen from 
  
MILLA     Canadian University Selectivity Premium 
 
 331
Table 3: Least squares and matching estimates of wage premium 
                                      Group A vs.  B & C                         Group A & B vs. C 
 
 GPA RR CI GPA RR CI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Least Squares Estimates 
coef. 0.031 0.004 0.005 0.030 0.013 0.027 
s.e. 0.026 0.030 0.029 0.026 0.025 0.024 
R-sq 0.287 0.286 0.286 0.287 0.286 0.287 
Matching Estimates, ATT 
coef. 0.032 0.041 0.016 0.067*** 0.059*** 0.072*** 
s.e. 0.028 0.032 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.024 
Matching Estimates, ATC 
coef. 0.094*** 0.056* 0.069* 0.091*** 0.113*** 0.099*** 
s.e. 0.033 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.024 0.023 
N 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 
Treatment and comparison groups are indicated at the top of the columns.  Standard 
error estimates are weighted and robust. The list of covariates not shown in the table
is  as  listed  and described in section 4.1. The treatment variables are defined as 
shown is Table  2 using the university  type and the respective selectivity measure:
Entering Cohort GPA  (GPA),  Reputation Ranking (RR),  and the Composite Index 
(CI).  ATT= Average Treatment on the  Treated.  ATC= Average Treatment on the 
Control. coef.= Coefficient estimate. s.e.= Standard error estimate.  R-sq=R-squared. 
N= Sample size. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.  
 
Table 3, the estimates of ATT and ATC, even though not identical, they yield similar 
results, which in most cases are statistically not different (except for column (1) and 
(2)).13 
5.2    Instrumental variable estimates 
Following the description of the estimation approach in Section 3.3, in this subsection I 
discuss the instrumental variable estimates that are shown in Table  4.  
In the third panel of the table I show the unconditional correlation coefficients 
between the endogenous variable (university selectivity) and the instruments (average 
selectivity measure in student’s high school province and the difference from that of 
province where student studied university), which are higher than those reported in Long 
                                                 
13 The more commonly used balance test for matching estimates (Smith & Todd, 2005) is left out of the 
paper in favor of space, but the tables are available from the author. Results are similar to those 
presented in the paper. 
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018) 313-349 
 332
(2008) and Borgen (2014) and vary between 0.13–0.63. The first stage regressions 
indicate that the instruments are both relevant, except for column (2). I report the 
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). In all cases the test indicates 
that the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error term. 
Table 4: Instrumental variable estimates of wage premium 
                                                   Group A vs.  B & C                            Group A & B vs. C 
 
 GPA RR CI GPA RR CI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IV-GMM Second Stage       
coef. 0.077** 0.144 0.127 0.148* 0.060 0.107 
s.e. 0.035 0.180 0.141 0.078 0.038 0.079 
R-sq 0.276 0.263 0.264 0.264 0.275 0.272 
First Stage       
∆Average Selectivity Measure 0.607*** 0.068 0.347** 0.218 0.917*** 0.552** 
s.e. 0.038 0.091 0.166 0.135 0.087 0.210 
Average Selectivity Measure 0.269*** 0.540* 0.512** 0.804*** 0.737*** 0.728*** 
s.e. 0.089 0.280 0.248 0.157 0.179 0.161 
R-sq 0.442 0.216 0.297 0.426 0.507 0.450 
Unconditional correlation coefficient between the endogenous variable and the instruments: 
∆Average Selectivity Measure 0.63 0.13 0.41 0.43 0.58 0.44 
Average Selectivity Measure 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.34 0.52 
Overidentification Test p-value 0.798 0.199 0.367 0.231 0.864 0.384 
N 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 
Treatment and comparison groups are indicated at the top of the columns. Standard error estimates are
weighted and robust. The list of covariates not shown in the table is as listed and described in section 4.1.
The treatment variables are defined as shown is Table 2 using the university type and the respective 
selectivity measure: Entering Cohort GPA (GPA), Reputation Ranking (RR), and the Composite Index
(CI). coef.= Coefficient estimate. s.e.= Standard error estimate. R-sq= R-squared. N= Sample size. ***p < 
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10. 
The IV estimates indicate a 8% premium on the hourly wage for those that graduated   
from a Group A university in comparison to other universities. The premium is 14.8% 
when the treatment is defined as graduating from a Group A or B university versus a 
Group C university.   In both cases the treatment groups are defined using the Entering 
Cohort GPA as the selectivity measure. For the other cases when the treatment definition 
is based on the RR and the CI (columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)), the premium varies between 
6–14.4% but is statistically insignificant. Finally, with respect to the estimate in column 
(4), even though the IV estimate is almost twice the ATT estimate of Table 3, they are 
statistically not different. 
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 5.3    Robustness analysis 
Analyzing the distribution of the predicted probability of attending a better university 
as defined by each treatment variable, commonly referred to as the propensity score 
(PS), may allow us to look into another aspect of the student composition of the 
treatment and comparison groups. The PS is simply the predicted outcome from a 
logit equation of the treatment indicator variable on all covariates that I use in the 
multivariate matching to construct Table 3 estimates. The kernel density estimates are 
displayed in Figure A.1 and A.2. In the former the PS distribution for the treatment 
group is an almost symmetric bell shaped, whereas the distribution of the comparison 
group is right-skewed. In the latter the PS distribution for the treatment group is left-
skewed and the one for the comparison group is right skewed. One may be concerned 
on whether the NNM estimates presented in Table 3 are driven by and reflect mostly 
the students with high PS. As a robustness check, I trimmed the tails of the PS 
distribution and kept the students whose PS score fell within the inter-quartile range 
(IQR). The empirical distributions are shown in Figures A.3 and A.4. 
Using the IQR sample I reproduce the estimation results of Tables 3 and 4, and 
display the estimates in Tables A.6 and A.7. These estimates are very similar to the 
previous estimates that I retrieve using the full sample: LS estimates hover between 1–
4% and are statistically insignificant; the NNM estimates of ATT effect are between 6–
8% and statistically significant at conventional levels; ATC estimates are statistically 
equal to ATT estimates; the IV estimates provide a statistically premium of 8–13%. 
5.4    Selection after  enrollment 
The paper so far has discussed and addressed the issue of non-random selection of 
students in universities of different selectivity at the enrollment stage. What happens in 
the stages that follow after enrollment could also potentially lead to non-random 
selection. 
Dropping out of university is likely to be systematically different across universities 
of different quality. Also, some of the students may take longer to graduate than others, 
and once they do, they may enter the labor market or pursue graduate studies. Those who 
enter the labor market may be working full time or part time. Any or all of these choices 
are also sources of sample selection which could potentially distort the estimation 
results if they are systematically correlated with university quality. In order to test the 
presence of this type of non-random selection, Table A.8 displays the regression results 
of several outcomes on the dummy indicators for the highest- and middle-third university 
groups, leaving lowest-third universities as the omitted category. These outcomes are: the 
probability of dropping out of university, time in months it took to complete the program 
and graduate, the probability of pursuing graduate school versus entering the labor 
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market, the probability of being employed at the time of the survey, and the probability 
of being self-employed. 
According to the grouping based on the Reputation ranking, group A university 
graduates are 6% less likely to drop out. Nevertheless, the outcome is not consistent 
across the other two types of groupings. The non-random selection due to dropping out 
behavior could be an issue with important consequences when working with data from 
countries where university retention and completion rates are low (e.g. Symonds, 
Schwartz,  and Ferguson (2011) report  a 56% retention rate in the U.S.). Canada’s 
universities have high retention rates of above 80%. When both RR and the CI is used to 
form selectivity groups, graduates of group A universities are 5–6% more likely to 
continue further their education with a graduate degree, and are about 4% more likely to 
find employment after graduation (the sample excludes the students enrolled in a 
graduate degree program). The former may lead to an estimate of the wage premium that 
is downward biased (since the better students of the top universities are out of the labor 
market), and the latter may lead to an overestimate (since group A graduates would be 
more present than group B & C graduates). As long as these two effects translate into an 
equal proportion of bias in the wage premium, these may potentially cancel out. Lastly, 
from the third panel of Table A.8, graduates of group A or B universities take 0.05 
months longer to graduate. This is a sufficiently small magnitude that is unlikely to 
affect the wage premium estimates. 
6    Conclusion 
Abundant evidence in the literature documents a positive and high wage premium to 
university selectivity. The majority of the studies use U.S. data or data from countries 
with a higher education system that are strongly differentiated. In this paper I survey 
the literature on wage premium of university selectivity and argue that not only the 
identification strategy and the method of estimation matter, but the characteristics of 
the different higher education systems also matter. I observe that the wage premium 
is lower in countries like Canada where the higher education is funded heavily 
through public funds and the universities are moderately differentiated in terms of 
selectivity. 
In addition, I use the Youth in Transition Survey, a unique and previously 
unexploited data to estimate the wage premium to university selectivity in Canada. 
This is the first paper which attempts to tackle the issue of selection on unobservable 
characteristics in the context of Canada. Using a matching estimator, I estimate a 7% 
premium on the hourly wages of graduates to selective Canadian universities. The 
instrumental variable estimates, that are free of bias from unobserved variables, 
indicate a 14.8% premium. The two estimates are statistically not different. 
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A question of immediate interest that has not been rigorously investigated in the 
literature is whether the positive premium of university selectivity changes in later career 
when the wage profile reaches equilibrium. Another question is related to separating 
between the potential channels that lead wages of observationally similar individuals to 
be 7–14.8% higher:  Is it the quantity/quality of human capital transferred from the more 
selective universities  or is it a beneficiary side effect of being in a network of better 
peers? Or is it simply signaling? Few recent efforts on early career wages provide 
support for the signaling scenario (Bordon and Braga, 2014; Lang and Siniver, 2011; 
Macleod et al., 2017) without unambiguously separating or ruling out the other potential 
mechanisms. These research questions are subject of future research upon availability of 
new data that permit such analysis. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary Statistics: Mean and St. Deviation (in brackets) 
 
  
A 
RR 
B 
 
C 
 
A 
CI 
B 
 
C 
 
A 
GPA 
B 
 
C 
Full 
Sample 
Age 27.14 27.08 27.08 27.15 27.11 27.02 27.14 27.10 27.07 27.10 
 (0.81) (0.84) (0.81) (0.81) (0.82) (0.83) (0.82) (0.83) (0.82) (0.82) 
Aboriginal indicator          0.01 
          (0.08) 
Black indicator          0.02 
          ( 0.14) 
Female indicator 0.55 0.59 0.53 0.62 0.51 0.57 0.60 0.51 0.57 0.56 
 (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Visible minority indicator 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.16 
 (0.42) (0.36) (0.32) (0.39) (0.41) (0.21) (0.38) (0.38) (0.34) (0.36) 
Both English & French Speaker indicator 0.29 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.44 0.38 0.43 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) 
Married indicator 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.47 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Disability indicator 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
Older siblings 0.94 0.68 0.80 0.87 0.71 0.81 0.93 0.69 0.78 0.79 
 (1.28) (0.84) (1.04) (1.17) (0.91) (1.06) (1.22) (0.92) (0.99) (1.04) 
Rural Residence indicator 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.09 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.33) (0.24) (0.28) (0.35) (0.23) (0.30) (0.32) (0.29) 
Province: British Columbia 0.28 0.13 0.02 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.13 
 (0.45) (0.34) (0.15) (0.42) (0.33) (0.15) (0.43) (0.37) (0.13) (0.33) 
Province: Quebec 0.01 0.29 0.08 0.30 0.10 0.07 0.30 0.15 0.05 0.15 
 (0.11) (0.46) (0.28) (0.46) (0.30) (0.25) (0.46) (0.36) (0.22) (0.36) 
Province: Manitoba, Saskatchewan 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.06 
 (0.11) (0.22) (0.30) (0.10) (0.31) (0.20) (0.26) (0.27) (0.17) (0.24) 
Province: Alberta 0.21 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.24 0.09 0.13 
 (0.41) (0.33) (0.29) (0.38) (0.32) (0.33) (0.22) (0.43) (0.29) (0.34) 
Province: Atlantic          0.08 
          (0.27) 
Parents PSE indicator 0.57 0.57 0.49 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.62 0.53 0.50 0.54 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
PSE very important for parents 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.87 0.86 
 (0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.34) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.35) 
Private High School Indicator 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.09 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.24) (0.37) (0.23) (0.25) (0.36) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29) 
Communication Skills 0.60 0.61 0.68 0.59 0.64 0.67 0.60 0.63 0.66 0.64 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) 
Problem Solving Skills 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.71 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.77 
 (0.45) (0.43) (0.39) (0.45) (0.41) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.40) (0.42) 
Math Ability 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.51 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.53 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
High School GPA 90-100% 0.22 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.09 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.16 
 (0.41) (0.38) (0.30) (0.38) (0.39) (0.28) (0.39) (0.39) (0.32) (0.36) 
High School GPA 80-89% 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.54 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Review of Economic Analysis 10 (2018) 313-349 
 340
Table A1: Summary Statistics: Mean and (St. Deviation) (continued) 
 
Volunteer indicator 0.66 0.59 0.62 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.57 0.61 0.65 0.62 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) 
Participation in School Clubs 2.51 2.41 2.10 2.34 2.43 2.13 2.53 2.29 2.21 2.32 
 (1.62) (1.49) (1.66) (1.55) (1.59) (1.64) 1.57 (1.52) (1.67) (1.60) 
Participation in Non-School Clubs 3.17 3.10 3.25 3.08 3.09 3.39 3.10 3.19 3.21 3.17 
 (1.42) (1.54) (1.58) (1.46) (1.51) (1.60) (1.42) (1.52) (1.60) (1.53) 
Alcohol Consumption Indicator 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.21 
 (0.41) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.43) (0.41) (0.39) (0.41) 
All Friends Plan PSE 0.38 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.44 
 (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Most Friends Plan PSE 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.45 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
GPA in 1st Year University 90-100% 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.21) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.17) (0.19) 
GPA in 1st Year University 80-89% 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.24 
 (0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.46) (0.42) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44) (0.40) (0.43) 
Major: Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.21 0.18 
 (0.33) (0.36) (0.42) (0.37) (0.35) (0.43) (0.39) (0.34) (0.41) (0.38)
Major: Business Administration, Commerce 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.18
 (0.40) (0.34) (0.41) (0.37) (0.37) (0.41) (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.38)
Major: STEM 0.35 0.33 0.20 0.30 0.35 0.19 0.34 0.37 0.19 0.29
 (0.48) (0.47) (0.40) (0.46) (0.48) (0.39) (0.47) (0.48) (0.39) (0.45)
Bachelor’s Duration in Months 52.87 52.69 52.48 52.72 52.72 52.50 52.81 52.73 52.49 52.66
 (4.43) (4.36) (5.57) (4.40) (3.97) (6.31) (4.14) (4.66) (5.45) (4.86)
Occ.: Management, Business, Finance and 
Administration 
0.27 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.34 0.28
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.43) (0.45) (0.47) (0.43) (0.43) (0.47) (0.45)
Occ.: Natural and Applied Sciences 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.25 0.32 0.19 0.25
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.39) (0.45) (0.44) (0.39) (0.43) (0.47) (0.39) (0.43)
Occ.: Social Sciences, Education and Governmental 
Services 
0.25 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.26
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.46) (0.44) (0.43) (0.44)
Experience in Months 40.65 42.66 41.28 41.33 43.32 39.53 41.11 43.72 40.23 41.66
 (24.17) (24.67) (22.93
)
(24.27) (25.34) (21.03
)
23.00 (25.54) (22.92) (23.91)
Hourly wage 26.07 25.88 24.38 25.52 26.39 23.68 25.37 26.60 24.28 25.37
 (9.98) (10.71) (9.60) (9.69) (10.58) (9.77) (9.93) (10.83) (9.56) (10.15)
Observations 230 536 710 309 579 588 313 487 676 1476
 
The descriptive statistics for the following variables were suppressed in the disclosure process 
for the desegregated samples due to small cell size: Atlantic provinces residence dummy, 
Black indicator, Aboriginal indicator. 
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Table A.2: Correlation coefficients of regression variables 
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Communication Skills 1
Problem Solving Skills 0.5 1
Math Ability 0.1 0.1 1
High School GPA 0 0.1 0.2 1
GPA in 1st Year University 0 0 0 0.4 1
Volunteer indicator 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 1
Participation in School Clubs 0.2 0.1 -0 0.2 0.1 0.2 1
Participation in Non-School Clubs 0.1 -0 0.1 0 -0 0.2 0 1
Age 0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 1
Female indicator 0.1 0.1 -0 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 -0 -0 1
Visible minority indicator -0 0 0.1 0 0 0 -0 -0 -0 -0 1
Aboriginal indicator -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 1
Black indicator 0 0 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 -0 0 0 0.4 -0 1
Both English & French Speaker indicator 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0 -0 0.1 -0 -0 0.1 1
Married indicator 0.1 -0 -0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0 0 -0 0.04 1
Disability indicator 0 0 -0 -0 0 0 0 -0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 0.07 0 1
Older siblings -0 -0 0 -0 0.1 0 0 -0 -0 0.1 -0 -0 0 -0 0 0.1 1
Private High School Indicator -0 0 0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 -0 0 0 -0 0.1 0.08 -0 0 0.05
Rural Residence indicator 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0 -0 0 -0 0.1 0 0.02 0.1 0 0.13
Parents PSE indicator 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0.06 0.1 -0 -0
PSE very important for parents 0 0.1 -0 -0 0 0.1 0.1 -0 0 0.1 0.1 -0 0.1 0.05 -0 -0 -0
Alcohol Consumption Indicator 0.1 0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0.1 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 0.07
All Friends Plan PSE 0.1 0.1 -0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0 -0 0.1 0 -0 0 0.13 0.1 0 -0
Most Friends Plan PSE -0 -0 0 -0 0 0 -0 0 0.1 -0 0 0.1 0 -0.1 -0 -0 0
Major: Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts -0 -0 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0.1 -0 0.1 0 0 0.02 -0 0 0.04
Major: Business Administration, Commerce 0.2 0.1 -0 -0 0 0 0 -0 -0 0.1 -0 -0 0 0.08 0 0 -0
Major: STEM -0 -0 0.4 0.3 0.1 0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 -0 -0.1 -0 -0 0.04
Bachelor’s Duration in Months 0 0 0 -0 0 0.1 0.1 -0 0 -0 0 0 0.1 0 -0 -0 0.05
Occ.: Management, Business, Finance and 
Administration 0 0 0.1 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 0.2 -0 0.1 -0 -0 -0 0.03
Occ.: Natural and Applied Sciences -0 -0 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 0 0 -0 -0 0 0 0.03
Occ.: Social Sciences, Education and 
Governmental Services 0.1 0.1 -0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.2 -0 -0 -0 0.04 0.1 -0 -0.1
Experience in Months 0.1 -0 0 0 -0 0.1 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.1 -0 0 0.01 0 -0 -0.1
Hourly Wage 0.1 -0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0 0.1 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 0.1 -0 0.05
Reputation Ranking (RR) 0.1 0.1 0 -0 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 0.1 0 0.07 0 0 -0
Composite Index (CI) ranking 0.1 0.1 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 0.1 -0 0 -0 0.1 -0 -0 0 0 -0
GPA ranking 0.1 0.1 -0 -0 -0 0 -0 0 -0 -0 -0 0.1 0 -0.1 0 0 -0
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Table A.2: Correlation coefficients of regression variables (continued) 
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Private High School Indicator 1
Rural Residence indicator -0.1 1
Parents PSE indicator 0.11 -0 1
PSE very important  for parents 0 -0.1 0.09 1
Alcohol Consumption Indicator -0 0.09 0.06 0 1
All Friends Plan PSE 0.11 -0 0.07 0.02 -0 1
Most Friends Plan PSE -0.1 0.03 -0 0.02 0 -0.8 1
Major: Social Sciences, Humanities and Arts 0.08 -0 -0 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Major: Business Administration, Commerce -0 0 0.02 0.04 -0 0.02 -0 -0.2 1
Major: STEM 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0 -0.1 -0.1 0.07 -0.3 -0.3 1
Bachelor’s Duration in Months 0.07 0.01 -0 0.04 0 -0.1 0.07 -0 0 0.05 1
Occ.: Management, Business, Finance and 
Administration -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.06 -0 -0 -0 0.41 -0.1 -0.2 0.04 1
Occ.: Natural and Applied Sciences 0.06 0.03 -0.1 -0 -0.1 -0.1 0.04 -0.2 -0.2 0.44 0.05 -0.4 1
Occ.: Social Sciences, Education and 
Governmental Services 0.07 0.06 0.08 -0 0 0.06 -0 -0.2 0.17 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 1
Experience in Months -0.1 -0.1 -0 0.03 0.02 -0.1 0.04 0.07 -0 -0.1 0.01 0.05 -0 -0.1 1
Hourly Wage 0 -0 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0 0.09 -0.2 0.14 0.01 -0.1 0.22 -0.1 0.09 1
Reputation Ranking (RR) -0.1 0.06 -0.1 -0.1 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.03 -0.2 -0 0.08 -0.1 0 0 -0.1 1
Composite Index (CI) ranking -0.1 0.08 -0.1 -0.1 -0 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.08 -0.2 -0 0.1 -0.1 -0 -0 -0.1 0.79 1
GPA ranking -0.1 0.05 -0.1 -0.1 -0 0.04 0 0.09 0.05 -0.1 -0 0.11 -0.1 -0.1 -0 -0.1 0.77 0.84 1
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Figure A.1: Propensity score distribution of Group A vs. B & C 
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Figure A.2: Propensity score distribution of Group A & B vs. C 
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Figure A.3: Propensity score distribution of Group A vs. B & C of the IQR 
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Figure A.4: Propensity score distribution of Group A & B vs. C of the IQR 
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Table A.3: Summary statistics and the weighting scheme of university characteristics 
 
Variable Composite Index Weight Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Entering Cohort GPA 0.431 81.617 3.467 75 89 
Faculty-Student Ratio 0.083 0.198 0.043 0.100 0.280 
Faculty with PhDs 0.369 88.078 10.866 38.2 98.400 
Student Awards 0.494 3.563 2.307 0.200 9.500 
Faculty Awards 0.462 3.534 3.021 0 10.700 
SSHR Grants Number 0.462 16.615 11.051 1.500 47.730 
 
Table A.4: Correlation coefficients among university characteristics used to build the 
Composite Index (CI) ranking 
 Entering 
Cohort 
GPA 
Faculty-
Student 
Ratio 
Faculty 
with PhDs 
Student 
Awards 
Faculty 
Awards 
SSHR 
Number 
Entering Cohort GPA 1      
Faculty-Student Ratio 0.29 1     
Faculty with PhDs 0.47 -0.01 1    
Student Awards 0.74 0.3 0.6 1   
Faculty Awards 0.64 0.08 0.51 0.81 1  
SSHR Number 0.64 0.09 0.55 0.77 0.75 1 
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Table A.5: List of universities in each group that is defined in accordance with Table 2 
 
 
Group RR & University type CI & University type GPA & University type 
 
 
 
 
     A 
McGill  
Toronto  
UBC 
Alberta  
Queen’s  
McMaster  
Western 
McGill  
Toronto  
UBC 
Alberta  
Queen’s  
McMaster  
Montreal  
Laval 
McGill  
Toronto  
UBC 
Saskatchewan  
Queen’s  
Sherbrooke  
Montreal  
Western 
 Montreal Western Dalhousie 
 Dalhousie Ottawa Ottawa 
 Sherbrooke Dalhousie Calgary 
 Guelph Guelph Guelph 
 Waterloo Waterloo Waterloo 
 Simon Fraser Simon Fraser Simon Fraser 
     B Laval Saskatchewan Laval 
 Victoria Victoria Victoria 
 York York Alberta 
 Saskatchewan Manitoba Manitoba 
 Memorial Carleton  
 Calgary Calgary  
  Sherbrooke  
 Acadia Mount Allison Acadia 
 Wilfrid Laurier St. Francis Xavier Wilfrid Laurier 
 Mount Allison New Brunswick Mount Allison 
 St. Francis Xavier Concordia St. Francis Xavier 
 New Brunswick Memorial New Brunswick 
 Manitoba Wilfrid Laurier Carleton 
 Carleton UNBC Lethbridge 
 Lethbridge Lakehead York 
 Ottawa Acadia Concordia 
 Concordia Trent Saint Mary’s 
 Saint Mary’s Saint Mary’s Ryerson 
 Ryerson Ryerson Windsor 
 Windsor Windsor Bishop’s 
 Bishop’s Bishop’s Winnipeg 
     C Winnipeg Winnipeg Mount Saint Vincent 
 Mount Saint Vincent Mount Saint Vincent Moncton 
 Moncton Moncton Cape Breton 
 Cape Breton Cape Breton Nipissing 
 Nipissing Nipissing Laurentian 
 Laurentian Laurentian St. Thomas 
 St. Thomas St. Thomas Brandon 
 Brandon Brandon Brock 
 Brock Brock UNBC 
 UNBC Lethbridge UPEI 
 UPEI UPEI Trent 
 Trent  Lakehead 
 Lakehead  Carleton 
   McMaster 
For details on the group classifications (A, B, C) see Table 2. Acronyms for the 
selectivity measures are as follows: GPA: Entering Cohort GPA, RR: Reputation 
Ranking,  CI: Composite Index 
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Table A.6: Least squares and matching estimates of wage premium, IQR sample 
 
                                              Group A vs.  B & C                        Group A & B vs. C 
 
 GPA RR CI GPA RR CI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Least Squares Estimator 
coef. 0.041 0.006 0.038 0.034 0.038 0.038 
s.e. 0.037 0.046 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.028 
R-sq 0.312 0.282 0.274 0.303 0.289 0.287 
Matching Estimates, ATT 
coef. 0.070 0.023 0.033 0.059* 0.078** 0.058* 
s.e. 0.045 0.053 0.046 0.033 0.033 0.034 
Matching Estimates, ATC 
coef. 0.102*** 0.063 0.061 0.106*** 0.078** 0.069* 
s.e. 0.040 0.051 0.051 0.033 0.032 0.035 
N 738 738 738 738 738 738 
Treatment and comparison groups are indicated at the top of the columns. Standard error 
estimates are weighted and robust. The list of covariates not shown in the table is as listed and 
described in section 4.1. The treatment variables are defined as shown is Table 2 using the 
university type and the respective selectivity measure: Entering Cohort GPA (GPA), 
Reputation Ranking (RR), and the Composite Index (CI). IQR sample= The sample used for 
these results is composed of individuals with a propensity score (PS) estimate that falls within 
the Inter-quartile range of the PS distribution. ATT= Average Treatment on the Treated. ATC= 
Average Treatment on the Control.  coef.= Coefficient estimate. s.e.= Standard error estimate. 
R-sq= R-squared. N= Sample size. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,*p < 0.10  
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Table A.7: Instrumental variable estimates of wage premium, IQR sample 
                                                                   Group A vs.  B & C                         Group A & B vs. C 
 
 GPA RR CI  GPA RR CI 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
IV-GMM Second Stage        
coef. 0.089* -0.386 0.021  0.131* 0.080* 0.107 
s.e. 0.048 0.344 0.140  0.076 0.045 0.089 
R-sq 0.300 0.260 0.287  0.277 0.291 0.273 
N 738 738 738  738 738 738 
First Stage        
∆Average Selectivity Measure 0.608*** 0.080 0.388**  0.236* 0.885*** 0.664*** 
s.e. 0.042 0.097 0.161  0.136 0.109 0.222 
Average Selectivity Measure 0.322*** 0.254* 0.493**  0.936*** 0.885*** 0.837*** 
s.e. 0.108 0.135 0.236  0.204 0.218 0.192 
R-sq 0.390 0.135 0.209  0.311 0.415 0.393 
Overidentification Test 0.720 0.357 0.012  0.363 0.743 0.242 
N 738 738 738  738 738 738 
Treatment and comparison groups are indicated at the top of the columns. Standard error 
estimates are weighted and robust. The list of covariates not shown in the table is as listed and 
described in section 4.1. The treatment variables are defined as shown is Table 2 using the 
university type and the respective selectivity measure: Entering Cohort GPA (GPA), 
Reputation Ranking (RR), and the Composite Index (CI). IQR sample= The sample used for 
these results is composed of individuals with a propensity score (PS) estimate that falls within 
the Inter-quartile range of the PS distribution. coef.= Coefficient estimate. s.e.= Standard error 
estimate. R-sq= R-squared. N= Sample size. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.  
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Table A.8: Testing for sample selection after enrollment 
                                          Group A vs.  B &                        Group A & B vs. C 
 
 GPA RR CI GPA RR CI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pr(Drop out of university program) 
coef. -0.011 -0.060*** -0.019 -0.013 0.003 -0.013 
s.e. 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.014 
(Pseudo) R-sq 0.229 0.235 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.229 
N 2230 2230 2230 2230 2230 2230 
Pr(Graduate degree) 
coef. 0.005 0.051** 0.060*** 0.015 -0.007 0.015 
s.e. 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.021 
(Pseudo) R-sq 0.045 0.047 0.049 0.045 0.045 0.045 
N 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 
Bachelor’s duration in months 
coef. -0.004 -0.032 -0.030 0.003 0.049*** 0.012 
s.e. 0.017 0.021 0.019 0.017 0.016 0.018 
R-sq 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.036 
N 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 2089 
Pr(Employment) 
coef. 0.019 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.016 0.013 0.017 
s.e. 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.016 
(Pseudo) R-sq 0.103 0.110 0.112 0.103 0.103 0.103 
N 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 1679 
Pr(Self-employed) 
coef. 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.011 0.005 
s.e. 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
(Pseudo) R-sq 0.176 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.177 0.175 
N 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 
Treatment and comparison groups are indicated at the top of the columns. Standard 
error estimates are weighted and robust. The list of covariates not shown in the table is as listed 
and described in section 4.1. The treatment variables are defined as shown is Table 2 using the 
university type and the respective selectivity measure: Entering Cohort GPA (GPA), 
Reputation Ranking (RR), and the Composite Index (CI). coef.=Coefficient estimate. s.e.= 
Standard error estimate. R-sq= R-squared. N= Sample size. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.  
 
